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ARTICLE
The production of taste: ecologies, intersections, implications
Paul Geary
School of Literature, Drama and Creative Writing, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
ABSTRACT
This article examines the construction of taste and its implications 
for the socio-economic and aesthetic diversity of the theatre and 
performance landscape. It considers how tastes are produced and 
reproduced, both in relation to socio-political and cultural inter-
pellation and in relation to embodied and personal experience. 
Beginning with Bourdieu’s Distinction, the article explores how 
tastes are produced in relation to class and cultural capital. It goes 
on to propose an ecology of four arenas of taste production: 
authoritative instruction, performances of self, the comfort of famil-
iarity and the influence of associations. Each works in relation to the 
others and acknowledge the complexity of taste production, mov-
ing beyond Bourdieu’s generational model. These arenas of taste 
production are considered in relation to their implications in deci-
sion-making and judgements around the production, cultivation, 
resourcing and programming of arts practice. The article argues 
that taste is pervasive, infecting and inflecting judgements and 
decisions and, as such, needs to be acknowledged and used in 
the pursuit of greater diversity in the arts.
KEYWORDS 
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Introduction: the force of taste
Taste is a slippery term. It might refer to the sensory taste of eating, to our tastes in 
cultural and artistic events or artefacts, to tasteful behaviour or decorum or to an 
appetite, to have a taste for something. Our tastes are one of the most intimate and 
personal facets of our sense of self, caught up in what we desire, how we act and how we 
perform ourselves. According to the Latin proverb, De gustibus non est disputandum: 
there is no disputing taste; it is something that is inexplicably and simply true about us. 
But this is not the case. Our tastes are produced, reproduced, consolidated, shifted, 
reorganised and deployed; they are not simply true of us. And we are never free of our 
tastes; they are always already and continually at work in our encounters with the world, 
in our decisions, choices and judgements.
Taste is an important concern in terms of the theatre and performance ecology. While 
there are ways in which biases are both checked and countered, personal taste continues 
to have a force in the process of funding, making, advertising, encountering and 
evaluating artistic practice. In Luca Vercelloni’s The Invention of Taste, he traces the 
figurative use of the term (our taste in things) to the Renaissance, where ‘taste’ was used 
interchangeably with ‘judgement’ (2016, 5–6). Our judgements are never free of our 
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tastes. Tastes are pervasive, often unacknowledged and the result of a complex process of 
production. They emerge from a mixture of socio-political and cultural interpellation 
and personal experience and they are never stable and fixed. As such, it is often difficult to 
appreciate how our tastes are at work in decision-making. Taste infects and inflects 
judgements and decision-making and, in the artistic and creative industries, judgements 
and decisions by those in positions of power – creative producers, funders, developers, 
programmers – include and are framed by their tastes, with ramifications for the socio- 
economic and aesthetic diversity of the arts sector.
In this article, I explore various ways in which taste is produced and reproduced, 
disseminated and experienced, in order to think about how the construction of taste(s) 
might influence the diversity of the arts ecology. I begin with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Bourdieu [1979] 2010) where 
he outlines a theoretical approach to the production of taste with a particular focus on its 
relation to class and cultural capital. For Bourdieu, taste pervades one’s social being and is 
manifested as a seemingly ‘natural’ facet of both the individual and class structures. 
Bourdieu’s analysis continues to have power in unsettling the naturalisation of taste 
hierarchies and goes some way to expose their construction and deployment. Yet 
Bourdieu’s model is limited and, in the second half of the article, I offer a different 
model of four arenas of taste production: authoritative instruction, performances of 
identity, the comfort of familiarity and the influence of associations. I argue that these 
work in relation to one another in a complex ecology of taste production, including 
thinking about the doubling of taste as both literal mouth taste and figurative cultural or 
artistic taste, in order to conceive of taste as both socio-political and embodied, intimate 
and personal. What is at stake for the arts ecology here is precisely the pervasiveness of 
taste, its unaccountability while it continues to have a considerable force in decisions 
around diversity and the support, funding and cultivation of new artistic practices.
Bourdieu’s Distinction
Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste is a key 
theoretical and sociological study of taste, its production, dissemination and mainte-
nance within a class-based social hierarchy. For Bourdieu, ‘good taste’ is invariably 
associated with, performed by and continued for the benefit of, the upper or privileged 
classes, the cultural elites. Those with high levels of ‘cultural capital’ (social rather than 
economic assets, such as education, access to ‘high art’ and possessing the appropriate 
means for its appreciation) are instrumental in determining, (re)producing and conso-
lidating notions of good taste, in part as a means of preserving both their own privilege 
and the cultural status quo. This ‘good taste’ always operates by a process of distinction or 
difference from other tastes; those tastes associated with those with low cultural capital. 
And in a circular fashion, the categorisation of ‘good taste’ produces itself and, for 
Bourdieu, those with low cultural capital tend to accept the distinction between refined 
and coarse taste as both legitimate and natural, taking as simply true that which is 
produced. In Bourdieu’s analysis, those with lower cultural capital lack access to high 
culture and the legitimate means for its appreciation (including a ‘proper’ terminology to 
describe and understand it and a ‘respectable’ approach to it). This process, then, denies 
the less privileged from self-defining their own good taste, particularly in relation to arts 
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and culture, subjecting them to a standard of taste that seeks to maintain the very division 
and distinction that marks off the ‘high’ from the ‘low’.
The political manoeuvre identified by Bourdieu, whereby privilege is maintained 
through the construction of a particular mode of ‘good taste’, is the result of a problem 
that emerged in the 1700s. Vercelloni writes that the twin problems that arose in the 
‘Century of Taste’ were political and theoretical. The former, the political, was concerned 
with ‘making the pleasures of taste accessible to a wider sphere’, while the latter, the 
theoretical, ‘involved restoring a degree of certainty to aesthetic experience’ (2016, 40). 
These two problems were connected, both the result of increasing social enfranchisement 
(ibid): how to give greater access to arts and culture while maintaining authority over 
‘good taste’? This tension seems to motivate Bourdieu’s analysis and remains a key 
problem in terms of the diversification and democratisation of the arts in a way that is 
officially recognised and, importantly, supported and cultivated. The two questions are 
connected, precisely because the democratisation of the arts and the cultural acceptance 
of, and support for, a diverse field of tastes and practices undermines and fragments 
critical and theoretical certainty of what constitutes art and aesthetic experience. And it is 
these claims to artistic certainty that legitimise the authority and work of arts institutions: 
those programming, funding, promoting and developing artistic practice. The problem 
of taste continues its urgency; it is not merely consigned to history. This is because the 
theoretical problem is not just a problem in or of ‘theory’; it speaks to our most ingrained 
sense of what constitutes (good) practice and artistic taste. In every aesthetic judgement, 
including judgements by those propagating new work, there is always an implicit sense of 
taste and discernment; the theoretical problem is inescapable and always already informs 
the political problem of diversification and democratisation.
In Distinction, Bourdieu unsettles the naturalisation of taste by examining a particular 
constellation of social practices that produce and reproduce tastes. Writing in relation to 
what he conceives as a strict class system, Bourdieu’s analysis of classes of taste identifies 
significant differences in the artistic tastes of the working, middle and upper classes. He 
outlines the various ways in which ‘good taste’ is produced, including both through 
‘inherited’ and ‘acquired’ cultural capital (Bourdieu [1979] 2010, 73). At the intersection 
of the inherited and the acquired, he writes that
While variations in educational capital are always very closely related to variations in 
competence [. . .], the fact remains that, at equivalent levels of educational capital, differences 
in social origin (whose ‘effects’ are already expressed in difference in educational capital) are 
associated with important differences in competence. (Bourdieu [1979] 2010, 55-56)
Education goes some way to raising ‘tastes’, but it does not eradicate or level distinctions 
of class origin. Taste is not merely the result of training, in and through education 
(though this does play a significant part), but is also ‘the imposition of an art of living, 
that is, the transmutation of an arbitrary way of living into the legitimate way of life’ 
(Bourdieu [1979] 2010, 49). For Bourdieu, there is a generational (in its double meaning 
of generating and passing from one generation to the next) inculcation of taste that is 
manifested not just in stated preferences, but also in a manner of living. Taste infuses 
one’s being and is deeply internalised by means of the various structures and processes of 
hegemonic interpellation forming us as subjects. As Bourdieu observes, despite an 
equivalence of educational capital, social origins and class continue to hold sway in 
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determining taste and (access to and command of) cultural capital; and by extension, 
access to education is not enough to eradicate or level differences in participation in the 
arts, because that ‘art of living’, which includes various competencies, networks and 
connections, is produced through a broader life practice.
Bourdieu identifies and analyses the material conditions, outside of education, that 
formalise and concretise tastes. In a section of Distinction entitled ‘The Correspondence 
between Goods Production and Taste Production’, Bourdieu explores how the produc-
tion of goods (including cultural and artistic artefacts, which we might now extend to 
include the production of artistic events) appeals to already existing tastes, which are 
limited, given form and objectified in the cultural object or event. From unformulated or 
unconscious desires or drives, taste is formalised through its channeling and directing 
towards a cultural product: shaped, articulated and reinforced (Bourdieu [1979] 2010, 
227–228). Taste is then expressed as a directional ‘taste-for’ a particular product, which 
itself draws on and concretises the motivating principle of taste. This is a circular process, 
whereby taste builds on products and products build on taste, continually solidifying and 
shoring up the tastes of a particular class through the artistic artefacts and cultural events 
to which they have access. Having access to cultural and artistic events is, for Bourdieu, 
explicitly connected to competence in the cultural arena and the formation of taste; part 
of the continual reproduction of taste, which vests power over taste formation in the 
hands of cultural producers.
In summary, Bourdieu’s analysis explicates how tastes and subjects are formed and 
consolidated in relation to class and background, reinforced by their material conditions. 
Bourdieu unsettles and disturbs the naturalisation of taste through the class analysis, 
exposing its construction. Our tastes are shaped and produced in such a way that they are 
successfully internalised and sometimes in ways that are an ‘unconscious acquisition’ 
(Bourdieu [1979] 2010, 59). There is a direct relationship between the production of, 
access to and familiarity with, cultural products and personal taste, which, for Bourdieu, 
continues the interpellation of the subject as being of a particular class. By implication, 
decisions about the funding, resourcing and support of artistic practice always bear the 
traces of this produced taste, even (and perhaps most especially) when the decision- 
maker is unaware of their own taste and believes they are adopting a ‘pure’ gaze of 
rational judgement. The class system shapes and produces tastes, which are always 
already at work in aesthetic judgements.
Bourdieu frames his analysis in terms of classes of taste. It is a hierarchical model of 
taste production, predicated on the passage of taste through various structures (from ‘top’ 
to ‘bottom’) including from the higher to lower classes, from one generation to the next, 
from institution to visitor or spectator, from tutor to student. While this is useful on 
a macro scale, it does not account for the individual or personal experience of taste. 
While taste always carries the markers and histories of political and cultural production, 
it is made manifest as a seemingly individual, personal, embodied and sometimes 
apparently spontaneous experience. Bourdieu acknowledges some of this in conceiving 
of the naturalisation of taste, but his model is limited given the strict hierarchical and 
generational thrust of his analysis. It also does not consider the embodied and lived 
experience of taste and the ways in which bodies negotiate competing discourses, cultures 
and identities in the formation and deployment of taste. If those involved in cultural 
production (artists, producers, funders, marketers, institutions) are to engage in the 
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checking of tastes in order to diversify the artistic ecology, then there needs to be an 
acknowledgement of the various ways taste is produced, reinforced and experienced. In 
the following half of this article, I propose a horizontal ecology of arenas of taste 
production, which includes, but also moves away from, the strict authoritative hierarchy 
of Bourdieu.
Four arenas of taste production
To expand the conceptualisation of how taste is produced and maintained is important 
for a number of reasons. To conceive of taste production only as an institutional 
authority is limited and does not give an account of the embodied and experiential; 
where taste is experienced as something intimately of the body and the self. These are key 
facets of the deployment of taste, where we experience it as something deeply personal 
and connected to our sense of self: who we are and what we like. It is clear that this sense 
of self is not fixed and static, it is produced, reproduced, consolidated, interrupted, 
configured and reconfigured. If arts producers are to diversify the arts ecology, then 
the checking of personal tastes is an important gesture to prevent the imposition not only 
of a personal but also political class of taste. The deployment of taste is, in some ways, 
performative: it is not merely an articulation of a taste that has been produced, but 
continues the process of producing and reproducing tastes, both for the individual and 
the cultural scene.
I map out here four arenas of taste production that work in tandem with one another – 
authoritative instruction, the performance of identity, the comfort of familiarity and the 
influence of associations – to expose the complexity of taste production and to start to 
give an account of its embodied, felt, emotive and personal force. To do this, I draw on 
work on taste and the senses, in order to make use of, and make connections between, 
figurative taste (what one appreciates) and literal taste (the experience of taste in eating). 
I attempt to explore how these two broad categories of taste might speak more directly to 
and about one another, especially in how the cognitive-reflective figurative taste is shaped 
and framed by perceptive-embodied literal taste and vice versa. The importance of taking 
account of the multifaceted production of taste is to draw attention to the simultaneity of 
the personal and political; to be aware of the various pressures that are at work in 
decision-making grounded (even indirectly) in taste; and to avoid a too-simple binary 
choice between the collective taste of the class group and seemingly pure, transcendental 
and absolute free choice in taste; between absolute (class) determination and absolute 
agency and freedom.
Authoritative instruction
Bourdieu’s model of taste is authoritative, mapping how various institutional authorities 
indoctrinate each individual with an appropriate taste relative to their position in the 
class social hierarchy. Authoritative instruction in taste can take a number of forms: the 
educational system, exposure and learning within the institution of the family, through 
the figure of the ‘expert’ giving guidance (for instance, in cultural radio or television 
programmes, in print media and in theatre criticism and reviews) and even less directly 
through institutional support of particular practices. In the latter, the amount of funding 
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an artist or show receives and how that translates into ‘production values’, the institu-
tional stamp on a poster, the inclusion in an institutional programme, the scale of a show 
and size of space in which it is hosted or housed all contribute to instruction in taste by 
providing markers of the worthiness of a given cultural product or event.1 And as with 
Bourdieu’s relation between goods and taste production, the expertise and authority of 
the institution is maintained by its endorsement of ‘good taste’, just as it produces the 
good taste on which its authority rests, perpetuating and refining taste in a way that 
maintains a classification of privilege and (cultural) capital. There are two kinds of 
authority at work here; what we might call ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ authority, which marks 
a difference between direct authoritative instruction (‘here’s what you should like and 
why’) and softer manipulation (‘look at how good this is, the support and acclaim it 
receives proves how good it is’). In both cases, there is a form of authority (institutional 
or apparent expertise) that produces and perpetuates ‘good taste’; authority as both 
a controlling power and as a power of influence (to be an authority on).
The work of ‘soft authority’ is in the realm of ‘cultural intermediaries’, an idea from 
Bourdieu’s Distinction and elaborated by Keith Negus as a ‘knowledge class’, ‘those 
workers who come in-between creative artists and consumers’, involved in ‘symbolic 
production’ frequently through ‘advertising imagery, marketing and promotional tech-
niques’ (2002, 502–504). Cultural intermediaries are those who shape artistic work and 
its conditions of production, including funders, development agencies and creative 
producers. Cultural intermediaries play a key role in determining a framework of under-
standing for artistic activity and in deciding to whom it should be directed and promoted. 
And that mediation itself always already carries with it the tastes of the mediator; 
mediation is not a neutral conduit, a form of administrative or bureaucratic work that 
merely facilitates, but the work of taste production, in how artistic practice is resourced, 
to whom it is marketed and in terms of the artistic practice that is chosen.
Within the authoritative model of taste is the notion of the ‘gatekeeper’. For Negus, the 
idea of the gatekeeper stresses ‘how key personnel control access to cultural production’ 
(ibid, 510). The gatekeeper controls access for artists to the institution, its support and 
who is deemed worthy of the taste profile the institution favours. However, Negus notes 
the limitations of this model, that it is ‘limited by the assumption that cultural items 
simply appear at the “gates” of the media or culture producing corporation where they 
are either admitted or excluded’ (ibid). The gatekeeper is not just an appraising figure, 
deciding whether an artist or work is worthy of institutional support (though this is part 
of it, and the individual tastes of the gatekeeper come into play alongside those valued by 
the represented institution). The process of crossing the threshold and being given 
material, financial or institutional support can potentially transform the tastes and 
activities of the artist, given the authority of institutions to shape work through its 
support and to inculcate principles of taste.
The authoritative model of taste is that offered by Bourdieu, where inclusion in 
institutions and within established fields of expertise produces, reproduces, frames and 
changes taste and artistic activity. In this model, particular tastes are enforced by those 
with cultural power and sometimes willingly pursued by those seeking to gain recogni-
tion and support. The ‘gatekeeper’ is a powerful position and, if those cultural inter-
mediaries become aware of, or trouble, their own (intuitive) tastes or pursue artistic 
practice that runs counter to tastes sanctioned by an institution, there is an avenue for 
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diversification of the arts ecology. Authoritative instruction in taste is a key facet of taste 
production, but it is rather deterministic and the very ability of cultural workers to 
pursue other tastes demonstrates that taste is not entirely determined or produced in 
this way.
Performance of identity
Taste is often experienced as something individual, intimately connected to one’s sense of 
self, even as it operates as a marker of enculturation. The external presenting or 
performance of taste acts as a way of signalling a mode of identity, or outwardly making 
claims of one’s tastefulness as a demonstration of self. The announcement or pronounce-
ment of my tastes in the public-social sphere showcases my priorities, interests, cultural 
allegiances and sense of self. And this public performance is not unidirectional, moving 
outwards from within me, but also works in the opposite direction: performing my tastes 
refines, reproduces and consolidates them. It is not artifice, merely a public show, but has 
a performative dimension whereby it produces that which it names: I profess a taste for 
a particular kind of work or attend a particular kind of cultural event, which then 
continues the construction of my sense of self and my tastes (including through the 
comfort of familiarity through repeated exposure). Indeed, the pleasures of our tastes are 
re-doubled. As Paul Bloom writes in How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We 
Like What We Like, ‘there is a self-consciousness to our pleasures. Humans can observe 
the pleasure or pain that we experience, and can get further pleasure or pain from this 
observation.’ (2010, 50) This circular process shores up our tastes, through the pleasure of 
pleasure or the distaste of pain, refining and consolidating (dis)taste through self- 
reflection, self-consciousness and discrete categorisation. This, of course, then has an 
effect on future behaviours: what we decide to encounter in terms of artistic practice, 
what decision-makers feel is worthy of support, and the categorisation of works being 
related in our mental schemas to whatever it maps onto our taste(s).2
There is a clear intersection here with Bourdieu’s work, given that our identities are 
constructed by and performed within social structures, including class. We align our-
selves with particular identity groups (in terms of class, race, gender, sexuality, belief, 
politics etc.). Each of these has its own cultural constellation of tastes and practices and 
our tastes are performed according to both the context within which they are proclaimed 
and as an individual amalgamation of multiple identity cultures. Indeed, we can think of 
the political drive to build a ‘brand’ of oneself through conspicuous consumption, using 
that material support (what one owns or what one chooses to do) to consolidate and 
demonstrate one’s identity. That material support furnishes us with continuity in our 
tastes; encouraging a sense of mastery over them; giving the sense that we appreciate 
complexity, subtlety and nuance because of increased understanding; and asserting a grip 
on our tastes from outside because of our continual and routine involvement in and with 
those materials.
The performance or articulation of taste within culture demonstrates one’s belonging 
to a particular social group or cultural history, and to operate within those culturally 
sanctioned coordinates is often a key facet of appearing to have expertise. In some ways, it 
is easier to adopt the tastes associated within a particular culture than to go ‘against the 
grain’, especially if the tastes one espouses can garner personal, cultural or material 
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success. But those rewards continue a ‘tasteful’ conditioning, which maintains divisions 
between tastes and continues to explicitly acknowledge some tastes as better or more 
worthwhile than others.
Comfort of familiarity
Our tastes are often grounded in that with which we are familiar and with which we feel 
comfortable. In this, our tastes are the result of our quotidian experience, forged through 
repeated exposure to particular experiences to the point where we have a degree of 
mastery over them; that we feel able to easily identify and understand the objects of our 
taste. In their writings on the process of tasting food, scientist Tony Blake and chef 
Heston Blumenthal discuss how connections formed by the simultaneous firing of 
neurons in the same event ‘develop lasting interconnections’ (2009, 263). Simultaneous 
experiences, whether or not they are intentionally connected, form lasting bonds. To 
extrapolate from this, connections between, say, an emotion and a sensory experience 
become entangled in the brain’s operations, so a feeling of pleasure at one kind of 
experience becomes associated with that experience. By virtue of previous exposure, 
our tastes are formed and produce certain expectations in advance of future experiences. 
To have repeated exposure to a particular kind of artistic or cultural event can produce, 
via an accumulative process, a solidification of our tastes and determine in advance how 
we might receive a new work depending on its correspondence with our pre-existing 
mental schemas.
Our perception of an event is not neutral: it will always be shaped and framed by our 
tastes, our previous experience and what we believe we like. Blake and Blumenthal write 
that ‘As a rough guide, seven to ten eating experiences can lead from dislike to at least 
acceptance.’ (2009, 465) It clearly takes a concerted effort to develop one’s tastes, yet how 
often do we persevere with those cultural or artistic events that do not immediately 
appeal to our tastes? Diversification requires a sometimes distasteful personal process to 
widen one’s tastes, to appreciate and support ‘other’ arts practice, in the same way that 
authoritative education can produce a particular spectrum of taste through enforced 
repeated exposure. Importantly, this model gives scope for self-consciously developing 
and diversifying our tastes, as by means of repeated exposure, we can learn to appreciate 
new flavours, and by extension new experiences of cultural or artistic forms (Blake and 
Blumenthal 2009, 465). This offers the means of conceptual escape from the potential 
determinism of Bourdieu’s model, as tastes can and do change, sometimes through 
a concerted effort. It offers the opportunity to work towards undermining hierarchies 
of taste and is particularly important for cultural producers in their role as taste-makers.
The process of producing and reproducing taste is cumulative. In Bloom’s How 
Pleasure Works, he proposes that our pleasure in things arises as enjoyment as an 
extension of what we already like (2010, 7–8). In an economy of experiences seemingly 
grounded in novelty and encountering the new, Bloom’s analysis seems initially out of 
joint with the dominant consumerist political system. In Danielle Gallegos and Alec 
McHoul’s article, ‘It’s not about good taste. It’s about tastes good’, they write of the 
‘neophilic consumer [. . .] who is on an endless quest for novelty. The quest is either, for 
Bourdieu, to reinforce class divides and find novelty as social distinction or, for [Colin] 
Campbell, to supply experiences not yet encountered [. . .].’ (2006, 169) In both cases, the 
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‘quest for novelty’ is perhaps a misnomer, as they both have (either social or personal) 
continuities at their core. Seeking new experience is a search for something ‘a little bit 
different’, slightly new, but not radically so. Bloom goes on to discuss this process of 
acquiring new tastes, that the ‘rule of pleasure is an inverted U’, where initial encounters 
with the new are not pleasurable because they are hard to process and prolonged 
exposure becomes repetitive and boring, with the pinnacle of taste and enjoyment 
residing between the two, where we are in a position to process and understand the 
work (2010, 127). This is highly personal and brings together individual and cultural 
experience in a model of taste that is not stable for the individual. What may seem 
outdated and dull to one spectator might be radically new and inventive to another. The 
challenge offered here is to explore and discover new tastes and practices through 
a concerted effort to move beyond the comforts of the familiar.
Influence of associations
This final arena of taste production begins to take account of the broader horizon of 
experience within which our tastes operate; that they do not operate as separate, discrete 
tastes for particular objects or experiences. The performance of our tastes, as a dynamic, 
continually shifting and intentional practice, is not only about the object or event to 
which our tastes are apparently directed. Our tastes for things are decentred through the 
connections and associations we have with the object of our taste. Even small associations 
or connections can influence whether something appeals to our taste. The journey to an 
artistic event, whether we are kept at a comfortable temperature, a distraction or an 
argument just before the event takes place or even the lingering of a smell in a space that 
we do not like can all produce in us a feeling or mood that can alter our enjoyment or 
appreciation of the work. We can form lasting connections between close events, which 
can profoundly influence our tastes, and apparently unconnected, extraneous conditions, 
by virtue of spatial or temporal proximity, condition our tastes. Taste is complex, always 
at work and influenced by associations with external or extraneous conditions from the 
work being considered. And even if we believe we know our own tastes, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to state with clarity what they are and what caused them.
Our tastes exist within a broad horizon of experience and an encounter with an artistic 
event or object can be clouded by those other elements. Indeed, rather than thinking of 
clouded judgements, we might instead consider that all tastes and judgements are bound 
in the particular circumstances and conditions of their production and enacting. In 
David Howes and Constance Classen’s Ways of Sensing, they discuss the irrationality of 
the ‘lower’ senses of smell, taste and touch that, because of their irrationality, are the 
‘most susceptible to persuasion’ (2014, 146). These aspects of our embodiment may 
influence us, even without our realising, in part through the relations between the senses 
in experience. In other words, we are often not consciously aware of how our experience, 
and by extension tastes and pleasures, are influenced by these other factors outside of the 
rationality associated with sight and sound (the privileged, distanced senses in the history 
of aesthetics). To attempt to locate our tastes in either rational contemplation or intuitive 
sensory embodiment is a false distinction, because they are intimately intertwined with 
one another (embodiment influencing thinking, thinking directing, shaping and framing 
embodied experience). These kinds of connections and associations are always at work 
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and may be personal (a work reminding one of a feeling of contentment, for example, or 
a lingering smell in the room associated with a loved one, which then becomes connected 
with the experience of the artwork) or they might be cultural (for instance, others 
laughing encouraging one’s own laughter as part of a collective experience and somati-
cally encouraging humour and enjoyment). Nevertheless, they not only influence our 
tastes but have a considerable role in generating them, in ways unconnected with the 
‘quality’ of the work itself.
Conclusion: implications of taste for diversification of the arts ecology
Taste is personalised, individualised and inescapable. It is the result of a complex process 
of construction, which mixes our class position, background and personal experiences. It 
includes that with which we are familiar, which of course comes in large part from our 
material circumstances; our access to (cultural) capital. Taste is internalised as an 
intimate trait of oneself and it is pervasive: what we like, what we desire, what we want 
to see, do and encounter. Our tastes are influenced by (sometimes unintentional) 
associations and connections, which may be personal, cultural, political or, more often, 
a combination of them all. Aspects of taste can be unconscious and affected by extraneous 
details and conditions. Importantly, our tastes cannot be put aside, as they are always 
already at work in any kind of decision or judgement. The importance of this for the 
cultural arena and arts ecology is that decisions are made, artists chosen for development 
and resources allocated by those whose tastes are always at work in those decisions and 
those tastes are hardly ever (if at all) purely about the work to which they are directed.
Negus draws attention to the problems of an imaginary divide between ‘personal taste 
and professional judgement (or leisure and work)’ (2002, 503). This is particularly 
problematic in the arts, where the lines between work, leisure and pleasure are especially 
blurred (if not non-existent). The tastes of those making decisions about the support and 
programming of arts practice inevitably play a role in those decisions, even when they are 
taken with the best of intentions. And there is a circularity to the production of taste: the 
tastes of the decision-maker produce the arts ecology, which in turn plays a role in 
determining (future) tastes. The political implications of this spread further than the 
diversity of the arts sector. As Howes and Classen argue,
The social control of perceptibility – who is seen, who is heard, whose pain is recognized – 
plays an essential role in establishing positions of power within society. Such control is 
exercised both officially and unofficially, and determines not only who is perceived, but also 
how they are perceived. (2014, 65-66)
For this reason, it is important to be aware of the complexity of how tastes are formed in 
order to begin to mitigate their hold over decisions on arts resourcing.
We cannot put our tastes aside and our tastes inform, indeed are wrapped up with, our 
decisions and judgements. In seeking to diversify the arts ecology, to make space for and 
to resource practices that do not operate within the realm of established good taste, it is 
imperative that cultural intermediaries, arts producers and funders engage in processes of 
the diversification of taste. There are two clear strategies for this: the diversification of the 
tastes of ‘taste-makers’ (funders, programmers, developers, producers) and, through 
diversification of programming and arts education, widening cultural tastes. As noted 
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by Gallegos and McHoul, taste can be understood as a ‘practical ethics’, a ‘technique of 
the self’ (2006, 171). To diversify the arts ecology, as an ethico-political drive towards 
inclusion and equality, requires substantial work in terms of the individual practical 
ethics of taste-makers and cultural workers; to pursue the broadening of their own tastes 
and, by extension, cultures of taste. This ethical work of the diversification of taste would 
produce a richer arts ecology, destabilise the structures of power that maintain cultural, 
artistic and, by extension, economic hierarchies and is, at its core, an ethical duty of 
enfranchisement and empowerment.
Notes
1. This institutional model of taste is exemplified by Paul Bloom when he recounts the story of 
an experiment by the Washington Post: Joshua Bell, a renowned violinist, went to play in 
a subway in Washington. He played six classical pieces on a $3.5 million violin, but was not 
recognised for his mastery. For the Post, this was an ‘unblinking assessment of public taste’ 
(Bloom 2010, 117). Clearly the institutional frame plays a significant role in the cultivation 
of ‘good taste’.
2. I draw here on the opening of Foucault’s The Order of Things, where he argues that 
categorisation of the world determines how we understand and engage with it (2002, xvii- 
xxiii).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council under Grant AH/ 
R012962/1.
Notes on contributor
Paul Geary is a Lecturer in Drama at the University of East Anglia. He completed his PhD at the 
University of Bristol, following which he was a Teaching Fellow at the University of Birmingham 
and a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Birmingham, De Montfort University and the 
University of Wolverhampton. His research focuses on the senses, food, performance and philo-
sophy, in particular engaging with the work of Martin Heidegger and Slavoj Žižek. He is engaged 
in creative consultancy for a restaurant and is on the project team for an AHRC research network 
entitled Incubate-Propagate: Towards Alternative Models for Artist Development in Theatre and 
Performance.
References
Blake, T., and H. Blumenthal. 2009. “In the Lab: The Science of Food at the Fat Duck.” In The Fat 
Duck Cookbook, edited by Blumenthal. Bloomsbury: London and New York. 462-466
Bloom, P. 2010. How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We like What We Like. London: 
Bodley Head.
Bourdieu, P. [1979] 2010. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Translated by 
Richard Nice. London and New York: Routledge.
290 P. GEARY
Foucault, M. 2002. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London and 
New York: Routledge.
Gallegos, D., and M. Alec. 2006. “‘It’s Not about Good Taste. It’s about Tastes Good’: Bourdieu and 
Campbell’s Soup . . . and Beyond.” The Senses and Society 1 (2): 165–181. doi:10.2752/ 
174589206778055529.
Howes, D., and C. Classen. 2014. Ways of Sensing: Understanding the Senses in Society. London and 
New York: Routledge.
Negus, K. 2002. “The Work of Cultural Intermediaries and the Enduring Distance between 
Production and Consumption.” Cultural Studies 16 (4): 501–515. doi:10.1080/ 
09502380210139089.
Vercelloni, L. 2016. The Invention of Taste: A Cultural Account of Desire, Delight and Disgust in 
Fashion, Food and Art. Translated by Kate Singleton. London and New York: Bloomsbury.
STUDIES IN THEATRE AND PERFORMANCE 291
